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Abstract
We consider stochastic differential games withN nearly identical players, linear-Gaussian
dynamics, and infinite horizon discounted quadratic cost. Admissible controls are feedbacks
for which the system is ergodic. We first study the existence of affine Nash equilibria by
means of an associated system of N Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and N Kolmogorov-Fokker-
Planck partial differential equations, proving that for small discount factors quadratic-
Gaussian solutions exist and are unique. Then, we prove the convergence of such solutions
to the unique quadratic-Gaussian solution of the pair of Mean Field equations. We also
discuss some singular limits, such as vanishing noise, cheap control and vanishing discount.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider an N–person differential game driven by a stochastic system of dif-
ferential equations
dX it = (AX
i
t − αit)dt+ σdW it , X i0 = xi ∈ Rd , i = 1, . . . , N , (1)
where A, σ are given d× d matrices, with det(σ) 6= 0, (W 1t , . . . ,WNt ) are N independent Brow-
nian motions and each αit : [0,+∞[→ Rd is a bounded process adapted to W it which represents
the control of the i–th player. Each player wants to minimize on the infinite time horizon a
discounted quadratic cost functional given by
J i(X,α1, . . . , αN ) := E
[∫ +∞
0
e−ℓt
(
(αit)
TRαit
2
+ f i(X it ;m
1, . . . ,mN )
)
dt
]
(2)
where X = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ RNd is the initial position of the dynamics, E denotes the expected
value, ℓ is a positive discount factor, R is a positive definite symmetric d× d matrix, and we set
f i(x;m1, . . . ,mN ) :=
∫
Rd(N−1)
F i(ξ1, . . . , ξi−1, x, ξi+1, . . . ξN )
∏
j 6=i
dmj(ξj) , (3)
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with
F i(X1, . . . , XN ) := (X −Xi)TQi(X −Xi) =
N∑
j,k=1
(Xj −Xij)TQijk(Xk −Xi
k
) , (4)
for suitable Nd × Nd symmetric matrices Qi and suitable reference positions Xi ∈ RNd. The
notation Qijk (j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}) is used for the d × d block matrices of Qi. In (2) and (3), we
denoted with m1, . . . ,mN the invariant measures associated to the processes X1t , . . . , X
N
t . In
other words, we are assuming that the cost J i depends directly on the state of the i–th player
only, while the other players only influence the cost through their asymptotic distribution in
the environment, since f i represents an average of the quadratic cost F i w.r.t. the invariant
measures of other players. The standing assumptions on the game (1)–(2) are summed up in
the following conditions.
(H1) The matrix σ in (1) is invertible, the matrix R is symmetric and positive definite and
the matrices Qi in (4) are symmetric.
(H2) There exist matrices Q,B, C1, . . . , CN , D1, . . . , DN and vectors ∆, H such that block
matrices and reference states in (4) satisfy for all i
Qiii = Q ∈ Sym+d , Xi
i
= H ,
Qiij =
B
2
, Qijj = Ci , Xi
j
= ∆ , ∀ j 6= i ,
Qijk = Di , ∀ j, k 6= i , j 6= k .
(H3) The matrix A is symmetric and there exist constants r, k > 0 such that R = r Id and
ν := σ
Tσ
2 = k Id.
In [2, 3] games satisfying (H2) were referred to as games with “nearly identical players”. Notice
that for such games we can rewrite (4) as
F i(X1, . . . , XN) = (X i −H)T Q (X i −H)
+
∑
j 6=i
[
(X i −H)T B
2
(Xj −∆) + (Xj −∆)T B
2
(X i −H)
]
+
N∑
j 6=i
(Xj −∆)TCi(Xj −∆) +
N∑
j,k 6=i
(Xj −∆)TDi(Xk −∆) ,
which, in particular, means that each player cannot distinguish among other players and tries
to reach his happy state H while pushing all competitors towards a common state ∆.
For games of the form (1)–(2), we study in this paper the existence of Nash equilibria through
the solutions of an associated system of 2N Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB, in the following)
and Kolmogorov–Fokker–Planck (KFP) equations
−k∆vi + 1
2r
|∇vi|2 − (∇vi)TAx+ ℓvi = f i(x;m1, . . . ,mN)
−k∆mi − div
(
mi ·
(∇vi
r
−Ax
))
= 0∫
Rd
mi(x) dx = 1 , mi > 0
i = 1, . . . , N (5)
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where the unknown vi,mi represent respectively the value function for the i–th player and its
invariant measure (with a slight abuse of notations, we denote with mi a measure as well as its
density), and div is the divergence operator. In view of the Linear-Quadratic structure of the
game, we look for solutions of the HJB–KFP system in the class of quadratic value functions
and multivariate Gaussian distributions. This produces Nash equilibria for (1)–(2) in the form
of affine feedbacks.
Our result for these games is that, for small values of the discount factor ℓ > 0, there exists a
unique Quadratic–Gaussian (abbreviated QG later on) solution to (5) and thus a unique affine
Nash equilibrium strategy. Moreover, we rigorously prove that, as the number of players N
tends to infinity, QG solutions of (5) converge to solutions of the Mean Field PDE system
−k∆v + 1
2r
|∇v|2 −∇vTAx+ ℓv = Vˆ [m](x)
−k∆m− div
(
m ·
(∇v
r
−Ax
))
= 0∫
Rd
m(x) dx = 1 , m > 0
for a suitable integral operator Vˆ mapping probability measures into quadratic polynomials of
the variable x. This latter result perfectly matches the ones obtained by Lasry & Lions in their
seminal papers [13, 14, 15] about differential games on the torus Td, and the ones on ergodic
LQ games in R and Rd (see [2] and [3], respectively).
Then, we investigate the relation between the games with discounted cost (2) and the ones with
long–time–average cost functional studied in [3]. Namely, using the same notations as above,
we consider the ergodic cost
J i(X,α1, . . . , αN ) := lim inf
T→∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
(αit)
TRαit
2
+ F i(X1, . . . , XN) dt
]
, (6)
whose affine Nash equilibria were characterized in [3] through the study of the corresponding
HJB and KFP equations. Here, we prove that the QG solutions giving Nash equilibria for the
game (1)–(2) converge as ℓ→ 0+ to the corresponding QG solutions for the game (1)–(6), as in
the case of classical differential games. Moreover, we prove that the limit procedures as ℓ→ 0+
and as N → +∞ commute.
Finally, we investigate other singular limits procedures, and prove that the deterministic (ν → 0)
and cheap cost (R → 0) limits for the games with ergodic cost (1)–(6) do commute with the
mean field limit (N → +∞).
Linear–Quadratic differential games have a large literature, see the books [4, 6] and the
references therein. The Lasry–Lions approach to MFG, originally introduced in [13, 14, 15],
has found application to several different contexts spanning from numerical methods [1], to
discrete games [7], to financial problems [8]. Large population limits for multi–agent systems
were also studied independently by Huang, Caines and Malhame [9, 10, 11]. They introduced a
method named “Nash certainty equivalence principle” that produces a feedback from a mean–
field equation, and shows that such control gives an approximate Nash equilibrium for the
N–person game if N is large enough. We cannot review here the number of papers inspired
by their approach, but let us cite [5, 17] for LQ problems, [18] for recent progress on nonlinear
systems, [12] on the rate of convergence as N →∞, and the references therein. In particular, we
mention that [11, 17] deal with discounted infinite horizon games as the ones we are considering
here. There are some differences between our results and the ones in the cited papers, though.
In [11, 17] more general costs J i are allowed, explicitly depending on other players’ states Xj,
but only the existence of approximate Nash equilibria is established. Here, we trade off the
generality of the cost to prove existence of exact Nash equilibria for the game, and to prove the
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relation between N–players games and their mean field limit, as N → +∞. More details will
be discussed in section 6.3.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we recall some preliminary facts for symmetric
matrices, algebraic Riccati equations and LQ games (1)–(6). Section 3 is devoted to the existence
of Nash equilibria for infinite horizon differential games with discounted cost (1)–(2). Section 4
contains the results about singular limits as ν → 0 (deterministic limit), R→ 0 (cheap control)
and ℓ → 0+ (vanishing discount). Finally, section 5 contains the proofs of the results and
section 6 discusses extensions and open problems.
2 Notations and preliminaries
2.1 Matrices and eigenvalues
In the following, we will use the notation Matm×n(R) for the linear space of realm×n matrices,
Id ∈ Matd×d(R) for the identical d× d matrix and spec(A) for the spectrum of a matrix A. The
linear subspace of real symmetric d× d matrices will be denoted by Symd and, for M ∈ Symd,
we say that M is positive semidefinite (resp. positive definite) if for all x ∈ Rd there holds
xTMx ≥ 0 (resp. if for all x ∈ Rd \ {0} there holds xTMx > 0). The notation Sym+d will be
used for the set of real symmetric and positive definite d× d matrices. Recall that for matrices
M ∈ Symd, the expression
‖M‖ := max {|ℓ| ; ℓ ∈ spec(M)} , (7)
defines a norm. In particular, ‖M‖ = max spec(M) whenever M is positive semidefinite. Also,
eigenvalues of a matrix depend continuously on its coefficients (see e.g. [19]) so that, for instance,
given a sequence of symmetric matrices An → A, the sequences of the minimal and maximal
eigenvalues of An converge, respectively, to min spec(A) and max spec(A). We conclude with
a property that will be used in the rest of the paper (cf again [19]).
Proposition 2.1 Let H ∈ Symd and K ∈ Sym+d . Then, HK is diagonalizable with real eigen-
values and the number of positive (resp. negative) eigenvalues of HK is equal to the number of
positive (resp. negative) eigenvalues of H. The same holds for KH.
2.2 Admissible strategies and Nash equilibria
Definition 2.1 A strategy αi is said to be admissible (for the i–th player) if it is a bounded
process adapted to W it such that the corresponding solution X
i
t to (1) satisfies
• E[X it ] and E[(X it)(X it )T ] are both bounded on [0, T ] for every T ;
• X it is ergodic in the following sense: there exists a probability measure mi = mi(αi) on
Rd such that ∫
Rd
|x| dmi(x) <∞
∫
Rd
|x|2 dmi(x) <∞
and
lim
T→+∞
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
g(X it) dt
]
=
∫
Rd
g(x) dmi(x) ,
locally uniformly w.r.t. the initial state X i0, for all functions g which are polynomials of
degree at most 2.
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In [3] it was shown that all affine strategies αi(x) = Kix + ci with Ki ∈ Matd×d(R) such that
the matrix A − Ki has only eigenvalues with negative real part, and ci ∈ Rd, are admissible.
Namely, considering αit := α
i(X it) with X
i
t solution of
dX it = [(A −Ki)X it − ci]dt+ σidW it , (8)
αit is admissible and X
i
t has a unique invariant measure m
i given by a multivariate Gaussian.
Definition 2.2 A vector of admissible strategies α = (α1, . . . , αN ) is a Nash equilibrium strat-
egy for the N–person game with dynamics (1) and cost J i given by either (6) or (2), if for
every index i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and for every admissible strategy αi for the i–th player there holds
J i(X,α1, . . . , αN ) ≤ J i(X,α1, . . . , αi−1, αi, αi+1, . . . αN ) .
The Nash equilibrium is said to be symmetric if all the players adopt the same strategy.
2.3 Algebraic Riccati equations
We recall here some basic facts about algebraic Riccati equations (ARE in the following).
Proposition 2.2 Consider the ARE
YRY + YA+ATY −Q = 0 (9)
with R ∈ Sym+d , Q ∈ Symd and A any d× d matrix, and introduce the following notations
ΞS :=
[
Id
S
]
∈Mat2d×d(R) , H :=
( A R
Q −AT
)
∈ Mat2d×2d(R) ,
where S is any element of Matd×d(R), and ImΞS for the d–dimensional linear subspace of R2d
spanned by the columns of ΞS. Then the following facts hold.
(i) Y is a solution of (9) if and only if ImΞY is H–invariant, i.e. if and only if Hξ ∈ ImΞ
for all ξ ∈ ImΞ.
(ii) If the matrix H has no purely imaginary nonzero eigenvalues, then equation (9) has solu-
tions Y such that Y = Y T .
(iii) If (9) has symmetric solutions, then there exists a unique symmetric solution Y with{
λ ∈ spec(A+RY ) ; Reλ 6= 0} = spec(H) ∩ {z ∈ C ; Re z > 0} .
In particular, if H has only real nonzero eigenvalues, then there exists a unique symmetric
solution Y such that
spec(A+RY ) = spec(H) ∩ (0,+∞) . (10)
The proof follows from standard arguments about Riccati equations that can be found in [6,
16]. We give here some explicit references for sake of completeness. Part (i) is contained in
Proposition 7.1.1 of [16]. Part (ii) is a particular case of Theorem 8.1.7 in [16]. Finally, part
(iii) is proved in Theorem 8.3.2 of [16].
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2.4 Results for LQ games with ergodic cost
In view of the study of the singular limits, we review the results obtained in [3] for LQ differential
games with ergodic costs. We start by noticing that, for the games (1)–(6), all players share
the same Hamiltonian given by
H(x, p) := min
ω
{
−ωT R
2
ω − pT (Ax− ω)} = −pTAx+min
ω
{
−ωT R
2
ω − pT · ω
}
.
Since the minimum is attained at ω = R−1p, we concludeH(x, p) = pT R
−1
2 p−pTAx. Therefore,
the system of HJB–KFP equations associated to the game is given by
−tr(ν D2vi) + 1
2
(∇vi)TR−1∇vi − (∇vi)TAx+ λi = f i(x;m1, . . . ,mN )
−tr(ν D2mi)− div
(
mi · (R−1∇vi −Ax)
)
= 0 i = 1, . . . , N∫
Rd
mi(x) dx = 1 , mi > 0
(11)
where the unknown vi,mi represent respectively the value function for the i–th player and its
invariant measure, and λi is a real number representing the outcome of the game for the i–th
player. Here tr and div are respectively the trace of a matrix and the divergence operator.
In order to formulate the algebraic conditions which characterize the existence of Quadratic–
Gaussian (QG in the rest of the paper) solutions to (11), we need the following definition.
Definition 2.3 Given matrices A ∈ Symd and N,R,Q ∈ Sym+d , we say that (A,N,R,Q)
satisfy the Riccati–Sylvester property if every symmetric and positive definite solution Y of the
ARE
Y
NRN
2
Y =
ATRA
2
+Q , (12)
is also a solution of the Sylvester equation
YNR−RNY = RA−ATR . (13)
The first result for N–players games (1)–(6) satisfying (H1) and (H2) was the following
(cf Theorem 2 in [3]): The system of 2N HJB–KFP equations (11) admits a unique solution
(vi,mi, λi) of the form
vi(x) = xT
Λ
2
x+ ρx , mi(x) = N (µ,Σ−1) , λi ∈ R , (14)
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ,Σ, with Σ positive definite, and suitable vectors µ, ρ, which
are in common for all the players, if and only if (A, ν,R,Q) satisfy the Riccati–Sylvester property
in the sense of Definition 2.3 and the matrix B := Q+ ATRA2 +(N−1) B2 is invertible. Moreover,
the affine feedbacks αi = α := R−1∇v, for i = 1, . . . , N , provide a symmetric Nash equilibrium
strategy for all initial positions X ∈ RNd and J i(X,α) = λi for all X and all i.
In particular, by going through the proof of this Theorem in [3], one sees that the coefficients
Λ,Σ, ρ, µ are determined by solving the following algebraic relations
Σ
νRν
2
Σ− A
TRA
2
−Q = 0 , Bµ = P , Λ = R(νΣ +A) , ρ = −Rν Σµ . (15)
with P := QH + (N − 1) B2 ∆, and λi = F i(Σ, µ) + tr(νRνΣ + νRA)− µT ΣνRνΣ2 µ with
F i(Σ, µ) := HTQH − (N − 1)HT B
2
(µ−∆)− (N − 1)(µ−∆)T B
2
H + (N − 1)tr(CiΣ−1)
+ (N − 1)(µ−∆)TCi(µ−∆) + (N − 1)(N − 2)(µ−∆)TDi(µ−∆) . (16)
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In order to study the behavior of QG solutions of (11) as N → +∞, we assume for simplicity
that the control system, the costs of the control and the reference positions are always the same,
i.e. that A, σ,R,H and ∆ are all independent from the number of players N . We also denote
with
QN , BN , CNi , D
N
i ,
the primary and secondary costs of displacement, respectively, which are assumed to depend on
N . Concerning these quantities, we require that they tend to suitable matrices Qˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, Dˆ with
their natural scaling, i.e., that as N → +∞ there hold
QN → Qˆ , BN (N − 1)→ Bˆ , CNi (N − 1)→ Cˆ , DNi (N − 1)2 → Dˆ , ∀ i . (17)
If we define an operator on probability measures of Rd by setting for all measures m ∈ P(Rd)
Vˆ [m](X) := (X −H)T Qˆ(X −H) +
∫
Rd
(
(X −H)T Bˆ
2
(ξ −∆) + (ξ −∆)T Bˆ
2
(X −H)
)
dm(ξ)
+
∫
Rd
(ξ −∆)T Cˆ(ξ −∆) dm(ξ) +
(∫
Rd
(ξ −∆) dm(ξ)
)T
Dˆ
(∫
Rd
(ξ −∆) dm(ξ)
)
then it is possible to verify that, as N → +∞, the solutions viN , miN and λiN of (11) tend to
solutions of the system of mean field equations
−tr(νD2v) + 1
2
∇vTR−1∇v −∇vTAx+ λ = Vˆ [m](x)
−tr(νD2m)− div
(
m · (R−1∇v −Ax)
)
= 0∫
Rd
m(x) dx = 1 , m > 0
(18)
like in [2, 13, 15]. Namely, if we assume that
ν ∈ Sym+d , R ∈ Sym+d , Qˆ ∈ Sym+d . (19)
the following facts hold (cf Theorem 3 in [3]). First of all, the system (18) admits a unique
solution (v,m, λ) of the form
v(x) = xT
Λ
2
x+ ρx , m(x) = N (µ,Σ−1) , λ ∈ R , (20)
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ,Σ, with Σ positive definite, and suitable vectors µ, ρ, if and
only if (A, ν,R, Qˆ) satisfy the Riccati–Sylvester property in the sense of Definition 2.3 and the
matrix B∞ := Qˆ+ ATRA2 + Bˆ2 is invertible. If in addition Bˆ ≥ 0, then the solution (v,m, λ) of
the form (20) is the unique solution of (18) such that v(0) = 0. Finally, assume we are given
a sequence of N–players differential games of the form (1)–(6) which satisfy (H1) and (H2)
and admit solutions of the form (14) for all N . Then, if the the limit system (18) admits a
unique solution of the form (20), we have that the QG solutions (viN ,m
i
N , λ
i
N ) of the N–person
game converge as N → +∞ to the QG solution (v,m, λ) of (18) in the following sense: for all
i = 1, . . . , N , viN → v in C1loc(Rd) with second derivative converging uniformly in Rd, miN → m
in Ck(Rd) for all k, and λiN → λ in R. For later use, we also remark that the coefficients
Λ,Σ, ρ, µ in (20) are determined by solving the following algebraic relations
Σ
νRν
2
Σ− A
TRA
2
− Qˆ = 0 , B∞µ = P∞ , Λ = R(νΣ+A) , ρ = −Rν Σµ . (21)
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with P∞ := QˆH + Bˆ2 ∆, and λ = Fˆ (Σ, µ) + tr(νRνΣ + νRA)− µT ΣνRνΣ2 µ, with
Fˆ (Σ, µ) := HT QˆH −
(
HT
Bˆ
2
(µ−∆) + (µ−∆)T Bˆ
2
H
)
+ tr(CˆΣ−1) + (µ−∆)T (Cˆ + Dˆ)(µ−∆) . (22)
3 Discounted problems
In this section, we extend the analysis of [3] to the case of infinite horizon N–person games
dX it = (AX
i
t − αit)dt+ σdW it , X i0 = xi ∈ Rd , i = 1, . . . , N , (23)
with discounted costs
J i(X,α1, . . . , αN ) := E
[∫ +∞
0
e−ℓt
(
r |αit|2
2
+ f i(X it ;m
1, . . . ,mN )
)
dt
]
, (24)
which satisfy (H1)–(H3). In this case, the associated system of 2N HJ–KFP equation takes
the form
−k∆vi + 1
2r
|∇vi|2 − (∇vi)TAx+ ℓvi = f i(x;m1, . . . ,mN )
−k∆mi − div
(
mi ·
(∇vi
r
−Ax
))
= 0∫
Rd
mi(x) dx = 1 , mi > 0
i = 1, . . . , N . (25)
Remark 3.1 Observe that if (H3) holds, then (A, ν,R,Q) satisfy the Riccati–Sylvester prop-
erty. Indeed, equation (13) reduces to k r (Y −Y ) = r(A−AT ) = 0, which is identically satisfied
for all Y ∈ Symd.
Theorem 3.1 Assume (H1)–(H3). Then, there exists ℓ¯ > 0 such that for ℓ < ℓ¯ the system of
HJB–KFP equations (25) admits a unique solution (viℓ,m
i
ℓ) satisfying
viℓ(x) = x
T Λℓ
2
x+ ρℓx+ c
i
ℓ , m
i
ℓ(x) = N (µℓ,Σ−1ℓ ) ,
for suitable symmetric matrices Λℓ,Σℓ, with Σℓ positive definite, vectors µℓ, ρℓ and numbers
c1ℓ , . . . , c
N
ℓ ∈ R, if and only if the matrix Bℓ := Q+ r A
2
2 − ℓ r A2 + (N − 1) B2 is invertible.
Moreover, the affine feedbacks αi(x) =
∇vi
ℓ
(x)
r , for x ∈ Rd and i = 1, . . . , N , provide a symmetric
Nash equilibrium strategy for (23)–(24), for all initial positions X ∈ RNd.
The proof is quite technical and it is deferred to section 5. Here we mention that, similarly to
the results in section 2.4, the coefficients Λℓ,Σℓ, µℓ, ρℓ, c
i
ℓ are characterized by
Λℓ = r
(
kΣℓ +A
)
, ρℓ = −r kΣℓµℓ , (26)
ℓciℓ = F
i(Σℓ, µℓ) + kr tr(kΣℓ +A)− k
2r
2
(µℓ)
T Σ2ℓ µℓ (27)
where F i is the function defined by (16) and Σℓ and µℓ solve respectively
ΣℓRΣℓ +ATℓ Σℓ +ΣℓAℓ −Qℓ = 0 , Bℓµℓ = QH + (N − 1)
B
2
∆ . (28)
with R := k2r2 Id, Aℓ := ℓ kr4 Id and Qℓ := Q+ r A
2
2 − ℓ r A2 .
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Remark 3.2 Observe that the conclusion of Theorem 3.1 fails when ℓ is not small enough.
Indeed, the ARE in (28) may fail to have solutions in Sym+d , which in turn would give no
Gaussian solution mi for the KFP equation in (25). To see this, recall that Proposition 2.2(iii)
ensures the existence of a unique solution Yℓ ∈ Symd such that Aℓ + RYℓ = k2r2
(
ℓ
2k Id + Yℓ
)
has eigenvalues which coincide with the ones with positive real part of
Hℓ :=
( Aℓ R
Qℓ −ATℓ
)
. (29)
Since λ ∈ R is an eigenvalue of Aℓ+RYℓ if and only if
(
2
k2rλ− ℓ2k
)
is an eigenvalue of Yℓ, it is
clear that Aℓ +RYℓ has real eigenvalues and that, fixing ℓ > 0 such that kr > (4λˆ/ℓ) for some
eigenvalue λˆ > 0 of Aℓ +RYℓ, the matrix Yℓ has a negative eigenvalue and does not belong to
Sym+d . Given that no other positive definite solution can exist, because any such Zℓ would give
positive spectrum to Aℓ +RZℓ and this would violate the uniqueness of Yℓ, this means that the
game (23)–(24) corresponding to this value ℓ admit no Quadratic–Gaussian solutions to (25).
To study the convergence of Nash equilibria as N → +∞, assume again that the coef-
ficients A, σ,R,H and ∆ are all independent from the number of players N . Also, assume
that the discount factor ℓ does not depend on N and that (17) holds for the cost coefficients
QN , BN , CNi , D
N
i . By denoting with (v
i
N ,m
i
N ) the solutions found in Theorem 3.1, we expect
that they converge, like for games with ergodic costs [2, 3, 13, 15], to solutions of the system of
two mean field equations
−k∆v + 1
2r
|∇v|2 −∇vTAx+ ℓv = Vˆ [m](x)
−k∆m− div
(
m ·
(∇v
r
−Ax
))
= 0∫
Rd
m(x) dx = 1 , m > 0
(30)
Along the lines of Theorem 3 in [3] (see also section 2.4), our main result for this system is the
following, whose proof is given in section 5.
Theorem 3.2 Assume that r, k > 0 in (30) and that the matrix Qˆ in (17) satisfies Qˆ ∈ Sym+d .
Then, the following facts hold.
(a) [Solutions to MFPDE] There exists ℓˆ > 0 such that for ℓ < ℓˆ the system (30) admits a
unique solution (v,m) satisfying
v(x) = xT
Λ
2
x+ ρx+ c , m(x) = N (µ,Σ−1) , (31)
for suitable symmetric matrices Λ,Σ, with Σ positive definite, vectors µ, ρ and c ∈ R if
and only if the matrix B∞ℓ := Qˆ+ r A
2
2 − ℓ r A2 + Bˆ2 is invertible.
(b) [Uniqueness] If in addition Bˆ ≥ 0, the solution (v,m) of the form (31) is the unique
solution of (30) such that v(0) = c.
(c) [Convergence as N →∞] Let assume ℓ < ℓˆ, where ℓˆ > 0 is the value found in (a). For all
N ∈ N consider N–players differential games of the form (23)–(24) such that (H1)–(H3)
hold. Assume that (17) is verified as N → +∞, and that the Mean-Field system (30)
admits a unique Quadratic–Gaussian solution. Then, the solutions (viN ,m
i
N ) found in
Theorem 3.1 converge to a solution (v,m) of (30) as N → +∞ in the following sense:
for all i = 1, . . . , N , viN → v in C1loc(Rd) with second derivative converging uniformly in
Rd and miN → m in Ck(Rd).
Moreover such solution is the unique one given in (a), with (v,m) of the form (31).
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4 Singular limits
We collect in this section, some results on singular limit processes for the LQG N–person games
and mean field games.
We start from the result on the vanishing discount limit, which shows the relation between
the solutions found in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, and their limits as the discount factor ℓ tends to
0. We prove that the limit procedures as ℓ → 0+ and as N → +∞ commute and that both
tend to the solution of the mean field equation for the problem with ergodic cost described in
section 2.4.
Theorem 4.1 For N ∈ N, consider N–players games of the form (23)–(24) such that (H1)–
(H3) hold. Assume that (17) holds as N → +∞ and that B∞ = Qˆ+ ATRA2 + Bˆ2 is invertible.
Then, the vanishing discount limit as ℓ → 0+ and the mean field limit as N → +∞ commute.
Namely, denoting with (viℓ,N ,m
i
ℓ,N) the solutions to the N–players game with discount factor
ℓ > 0, there hold
lim
ℓ→0+
lim
N→+∞
[
viℓ,N − viℓ,N(0)
]
= lim
N→+∞
lim
ℓ→0+
[
viℓ,N − viℓ,N(0)
]
= v (32)
in C1loc(R
d) with second derivative converging uniformly in Rd,
lim
ℓ→0+
lim
N→+∞
miℓ,N = lim
N→+∞
lim
ℓ→0+
miℓ,N = m in C
k(Rd) for all k, (33)
lim
ℓ→0+
lim
N→+∞
ℓviℓ,N = lim
N→+∞
lim
ℓ→0+
ℓviℓ,N = λ uniformly in R
d, (34)
where (v,m, λ) is the QG solution to (18).
Remark 4.1 As a byproduct of the previous proof, we have proved that as ℓ→ 0+ the solution of
HJB–KPF system for N–players games with discounted cost (23)–(24) converge to the solution
of the corresponding system for N–players games with ergodic cost (1)–(6). The same holds for
solutions of the Mean Field systems of PDE.
Next we consider the deterministic limit as k → 0+ (and hence as the noise matrix σ → 0)
and we prove that such limit and the limit to the Mean Field PDE as N → +∞ do commute.
Theorem 4.2 For N ∈ N, consider N–players games of the form (1)–(6) such that (H1)–(H3)
hold. Assume that (17) holds as N → +∞ and that B∞ = Qˆ+ ATRA2 + Bˆ2 is invertible.
Then, the deterministic limit as k → 0+ and the mean field limit as N → +∞ commute.
Namely, denoting with (vik,N ,m
i
k,N , λ
i
k,N ) the solutions to the N–players game with viscosity
ν = k Id, there hold
lim
k→0+
lim
N→+∞
vik,N = lim
N→+∞
lim
k→0+
vik,N = v
in C1loc(R
d) with second derivative converging uniformly in Rd,
lim
k→0+
lim
N→+∞
mik,N = lim
N→+∞
lim
k→0+
mik,N = m in distributional sense,
lim
k→0+
lim
N→+∞
λik,N = lim
N→+∞
lim
k→0+
λik,N = λ in R,
where (v,m, λ) are given by
v(x) =
√
rVˆ (x− µˆ) + rAx , m = δµˆ , λ = Fˆ (0, µˆ)− µˆT Vˆ
2
2
µˆ , (35)
for Vˆ :=
√
2Qˆ+ rA2, µˆ := (Vˆ 2 + Bˆ)−1
(
2QˆH + Bˆ∆
)
and Fˆ defined as in (22).
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Finally, we study the limit when the cost for the control r → 0+, and thus large control can
be chosen at cheap cost. Even if equations in (11) become singular when r tends to zero, we
can still use the formulas we found in the previous section to study the limit behavior.
Theorem 4.3 For N ∈ N, consider N–players games of the form (1)–(6) such that (H1)–(H3)
hold. Assume that (17) holds as N → +∞ and that B∞ := Qˆ+ Bˆ2 is invertible.
Then, the cheap control limit as r → 0+ and the mean field limit as N → +∞ commute.
Namely, denoting with (vir,N ,m
i
r,N , λ
i
r,N ) the solutions to the N–players game with control cost
R = r Id, there hold
lim
r→0+
lim
N→+∞
vir,N = lim
N→+∞
lim
r→0+
vir,N = v
in C1loc(R
d) with second derivative converging uniformly in Rd,
lim
r→0+
lim
N→+∞
mir,N = lim
N→+∞
lim
r→0+
mir,N = m in distributional sense,
lim
r→0+
lim
N→+∞
λir,N = lim
N→+∞
lim
r→0+
λir,N = λ in R,
where (v,m, λ) are given by
v(x) ≡ 0 , m = δµˆ , λ = Fˆ (0, µˆ)− µˆT Vˆ
2
2
µˆ , (36)
for Vˆ :=
√
2Qˆ, µˆ := (Vˆ 2 + Bˆ)−1
(
2QˆH + Bˆ∆
)
and Fˆ defined as in (22).
5 Technical proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Step 1. By simply inserting the expressions of vi and mi into (25),
one can transform the system of 2N equations into a system of equalities between quadratic
forms to be satisfied for all x ∈ Rd. Thus, by equating the coefficients of these quadratic forms,
(25) reduces to algebraic relations (26)–(28) among the coefficients of vi and mi.
It is now clear that if we show that there exists a unique solution in Sym+d to ARE in (28)
for small ℓ, then the existence and uniqueness part of the theorem would be proved. Indeed,
the invertibility of Bℓ is equivalent to the existence and uniqueness of solutions for the linear
system (28), and once Σℓ and µℓ are uniquely determined, conditions (26) and (27) also give
unique choices for Λℓ, ρℓ, c
i
ℓ.
We therefore focus our attention on the ARE in (28). By Proposition 2.2, solutions to (28) can
be found as the d–dimensional invariant graph subspaces of the 2d× 2d matrix Hℓ introduced
in (29). Noticing that we have Aℓ → 0 and Qℓ → Q = Q+ r A22 , as ℓ→ 0+, it is immediate to
see that
Hℓ −→ H :=
(
0 R
Q 0
)
and thatH has d strictly positive and d strictly negative eigenvalues. This latter property follows
from the fact that λ ∈ spec(H) if and only if λ2 ∈ spec(RQ) and that Proposition 2.1 implies
spec(RQ) ⊂ (0,+∞) because both R and Q are positive definite. Therefore, all (possibly
complex) eigenvalues of Hℓ will converge to some eigenvalue of H, and there exists ℓ¯ > 0 small
enough so thatHℓ has no non–zero purely imaginary eigenvalues when ℓ < ℓ¯. Propositions 2.2(ii)
allows to conclude that ARE (28) admits symmetric solutions for ℓ < ℓ¯.
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Owing to Propositions 2.2(iii), we also deduce that (28) has a unique symmetric solution Yℓ
such that the eigenvalues of Aℓ+RYℓ with non–zero real part are exactly the eigenvalues of Hℓ
with positive real part. But
Aℓ +RYℓ = k
2r
2
(
ℓ
2k
Id + Yℓ
)
,
is symmetric, so its eigenvalues are real and so are the ones of Hℓ. Using (10), we obtain
spec(Aℓ +RYℓ) = spec(Hℓ) ∩ (0,+∞) .
By setting δ := min
{
spec(H) ∩ (0,+∞)} > 0 and possibly reducing ℓ¯, we have for ℓ < ℓ¯
min
{
spec(Hℓ) ∩ (0,+∞)
}
>
δ
2
, ℓ k r < δ .
Hence,
min spec(Yℓ) =
2
k2r
min spec(Aℓ +RYℓ) − ℓ
2k
>
δ
2k2r
> 0 ,
which implies Yℓ ∈ Sym+d for ℓ < ℓ¯. We claim that such a solution is also unique. Indeed, if any
solution Zℓ ∈ Sym+d exists with Zℓ 6= Yℓ, then spec(Aℓ+RZℓ) = k
2r
2
(
spec(Zℓ)+
ℓ
2k
) ⊆ (0,+∞)
and this contradicts the characterization of Yℓ via (10).
Step 2. It remains to verify that affine feedback strategies αi(x) = (Ri)−1 ∇v
i(x)
r give a Nash
equilibrium for the game (23)–(24). Indeed, by applying Dynkin’s formula,
E
[
e−ℓT vi(X iT )− vi(X i0)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
e−ℓs
(
− ℓvi + tr(νD2vi) + (∇vi)TAx− (∇vi)Tαis
)
(X is)ds
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
e−ℓs
((
− ℓvi + tr(νD2vi) + (∇vi)TAx− (∇v
i)TR−1∇vi
2
)
(X is)−
(αis)
TRαis
2
)
ds
]
= −E
[∫ T
0
e−ℓs
(
f i(X is) + (α
i
s)
T R
2
αis
)
ds
]
with equality holding if αi = αi. Since E
[
e−ℓT vi(X iT )
] → 0 as T → +∞, because the value
function is quadratic and the strategies are admissible, we get
vi(X i0) ≤ lim
T→+∞
E
[∫ T
0
e−ℓs
(
f i(X is) + (α
i
s)
T R
2
αis
)
ds
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−ℓs
(
f i(X is) + (α
i
s)
T R
2
αis
)
ds
]
(37)
where we have used Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem in the last equality. Noticing that
equality holds only for αi = αi, we can conclude that the cost corresponding to any unilateral
change of strategy αi (the r.h.s. of (37)) is larger than the cost corresponding to αi, and we
have proved that (α1, . . . , αN ) is a Nash equilibrium strategy. ⋄
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Step 1. Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, from imposing the
expressions (31) in (30), we find that the coefficients Λ,Σ, ρ, µ satisfy the conditions (26)–(28)
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with Q replaced by Qˆ and with Bℓ replaced by B∞ℓ . We can therefore repeat the arguments of
the previous proof to show part (a). In particular, we can assume that ℓˆ > 0 is small enough
to ensure that for ℓ < ℓˆ there hold spec(Hℓ) ⊂ R and, setting ε2 := min spec
(
Qˆ+ r A
2
2
)
> 0,
min spec
(
Qˆ+ r
A2
2
− ℓr
2
A
)
>
ε2
2
, ℓ k r < 2ε . (38)
Step 2. Proceeding as in Theorem 4 in [3], it is easy to prove that Bˆ ≥ 0 is equivalent to the
monotonicity of the operator Vˆ [m]. Hence, we can repeat the arguments from [13, 15] to show
the uniqueness property (b).
Step 3. As a preliminary step towards (c), observe that QN → Qˆ as N → +∞ implies
min spec
(
QN + r
A2
2
− ℓr
2
A
)
>
1
2
min spec
(
Qˆ+ r
A2
2
− ℓr
2
A
)
>
ε2
4
> 0 ,
for N large enough, where ε is the value introduced in step 1 and we have used (38) thanks
to ℓ < ℓˆ. With the notations QNℓ := Q
N + r A
2
2 − ℓr2 A and HNℓ :=
(
ℓrk
4 Id
rk2
2 Id
QNℓ − ℓrk4 Id
)
, we
conclude that the matrix Y Nℓ ∈ Symd, solving the ARE corresponding to HNℓ , satisfies
min spec(Y Nℓ ) =
2
k2r
min {spec(HNℓ ) ∩ (0,+∞)} −
ℓ
2k
=
2
k2r
√
min spec
(
rk2
2
QNℓ
)
+
ℓ2k2r2
16
− ℓ
2k
>
√
2
k2r
(
ε
2
− ℓkr
4
)
> 0 ,
because of the explicit expression of HNℓ in the second equality, and (38). In particular, Y Nℓ
is positive definite. Observing that invertibility of B∞ℓ also implies the invertibility of Bℓ for N
large enough, we conclude that (25) admits a unique QG solution (viℓ,N ,m
i
ℓ,N) for large N .
Step 4. To pass to the limit as N → +∞, and complete the proof of part (c), let us concentrate
first on the sequence of the AREs in (28) as N varies in N. We can observe that HNℓ → Hℓ
in (29), and that eigenvalues of Hℓ are real by our choice of ℓ. Thus, the sequence of matrices
ΣNℓ solving (28) is bounded w.r.t. the norm ‖·‖ of the largest eigenvalue, defined in (7), because∥∥ΣNℓ ∥∥ ≤ 2k2r max {spec(HNℓ ) ∩ (0,+∞)} + ℓ2k ≤ 2k2r max {spec(H) ∩ (0,+∞)}+ 1 + ℓ2k ,
when N is large enough. There follows that ΣNℓ has a converging subsequence Σ
Nm
ℓ whose limit
Σℓ ∈ Symd solves
rk2
2
X2 +
ℓrk
2
X − Qˆ− r A
2
2
+ ℓ r
A
2
= 0 ,
which is analogous to (28), except for having Qˆ in place of Q. If we could prove that Σℓ ∈ Sym+d ,
then we would have, by uniqueness in Sym+d of this limit ARE (which follows from (H1) and
Proposition 2.2(iii)), that Σℓ coincides with the matrix Σ found in part (a) for the measure
in (31). This additional property on Σℓ follows again by the continuity of the eigenvalues: we
have seen in step 3 that for Nm large enough we had
min spec
(
ΣNmℓ
)
>
√
2
k2r
(
ε
2
− ℓkr
4
)
> 0 ,
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and this implies, as Nm → +∞, min spec
(
Σℓ
)
> 0, so that Σℓ ∈ Sym+d and Σℓ = Σ.
Now, we can pass to the limit N → +∞ also in the equation (28) for the average vector µNℓ :
since B∞ℓ is invertible, we must have Bℓ invertible as well for N large enough, so that
µNℓ = B−1ℓ
(
QH + (N − 1) B
2
∆
)
−→ µ = (B∞ℓ )−1
(
QˆH +
Bˆ
2
∆
)
, (39)
i.e., µNℓ converges to the average vector µ found in part (a). We conclude by observing that the
previous convergence results for ΣNℓ and µ
N
ℓ allow to pass to the limit in (26) and (27) as well,
so to obtain the convergence of the value function. ⋄
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Step 1. We start by proving that, when passing to the limit as ℓ→ 0+
in the discounted N–person game, the QG solution given in Theorem 3.1 converges to the QG
solution of the N–person game (1)–(6) given in section 2.4.
Let N¯ ∈ N be fixed large enough so that the matrix BN = Q+ ATRA2 +(N − 1) B2 is invertible
for N ≥ N¯ (compared to section 2.4, we added a superscript N in the notation to stress
its dependence on the number of players). For any N ≥ N¯ , let us consider the discounted
N–players game (23)–(24) and let ℓ¯ > 0 be the value found in Theorem 3.1. Since BNℓ :=
Q+ r A
2
2 − ℓ r A2 + (N − 1) B2 converges to BN as ℓ→ 0+, it is not restrictive to assume that ℓ¯
is small enough to have BNℓ invertible for ℓ < ℓ¯.
First, we focus our attention on the ARE in (28) and we fix any sequence ℓn → 0+ with ℓn < ℓ¯.
By proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 above, we obtain that the sequence Σℓn of solutions
of (28) in Sym+d is bounded, and that any convergent subsequence has limit belonging to Sym
+
d
and solving the ARE in (15). Therefore, by uniqueness, we conclude that Σℓn converges to the
solution Σ of (15) found in Theorem 2 of [3].
By passing to the limit ℓ→ 0+ also in the equation for the average vector µℓ in (28), we obtain
µℓ = (BNℓ )−1
(
QH + (N − 1) B
2
∆
)
−→ µ = (BN)−1
(
QH + (N − 1) B
2
∆
)
, (40)
i.e., µℓ converges to the average vector µ found in (15). In turn, Σℓ → Σ and µℓ → µ together
with (26), imply Λℓ → Λ and ρℓ → ρ to the coefficients Λ, ρ in (15).
Finally, from (27) we deduce easily that ci → +∞, but also ℓ ci → λi and ℓviℓ(x) → λi with
λi = F i(Σ, µ) + tr(νRνΣ + νRA)− µT ΣνRνΣ2 µ and F i given by (16), as in section 2.4. Thus,
we conclude
viℓ(x) − viℓ(0) = xT
Λℓ
2
x+ ρℓx −→ xT Λ
2
x+ ρx = vi(x) ,
recovering the expected value function of the problem with ergodic cost.
Step 2. Now we study the limit as ℓ→ 0+ of the mean field system (30), and we fix ℓ˜ > 0 small
enough to have that ℓ < ℓ˜ implies invertibility of the matrix B∞ℓ , defined in Theorem 3.2.
For games with ℓ < ℓ˜, the part of step 1 about solutions of the ARE can be repeated, provided
we replace Q with Qˆ in the various formulas derived from (30). Namely, we can prove that the
positive definite solutions Σˆℓ converge, as ℓ → 0+, to the matrix Σ ∈ Sym+d which solves ARE
in (21). Then, by passing to the limit in the equation for the average µℓ in (21), we obtain
µℓ = (B∞ℓ )−1
(
QˆH +
Bˆ
2
∆
)
−→ µ = (B∞)−1
(
QˆH +
Bˆ
2
∆
)
. (41)
The remaining coefficients converge like in step 1. In particular, ℓvℓ → λ = Fˆ (Σ, µ)+tr(νRνΣ+
νRA)− µT ΣνRνΣ2 µ, with Fˆ given by (22), as in section 2.4.
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Step 3. By combining step 1 with the result on the mean field system (18) in section 2.4, we
obtain that
lim
N→+∞
lim
ℓ→0+
[
viℓ,N − viℓ,N (0)
]
= v , lim
N→+∞
lim
ℓ→0+
miℓ,N = m, lim
N→+∞
lim
ℓ→0+
ℓviℓ,N = λ ,
in the appropriate topologies. Now, if we denote with ℓˆ > 0 the minimum between the value
found in Theorem 3.2(a) and the value ℓ˜ in step 2, for ℓ < ℓˆ the N–players game (23)–(24)
has QG solutions, for all N ∈ N. Moreover, taking N large enough so that BNℓ is invertible
(because it converges to the invertible matrix B∞ℓ , as N → +∞), the QG solution is unique and
it converges as N → +∞ to the solution of (30), by Theorem 3.2(c). Thus, owing to step 2,
lim
ℓ→0+
lim
N→+∞
[
viℓ,N − viℓ,N (0)
]
= v , lim
ℓ→0+
lim
N→+∞
miℓ,N = m, lim
ℓ→0+
lim
N→+∞
ℓviℓ,N = λ ,
so that (32)–(34) hold and this concludes the proof. ⋄
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Step 1. Using again the notation BN = Q+ ATRA2 + (N − 1) B2 , the
convergence BN → B∞ as N → +∞ implies that there exists N¯ ∈ N such that BN is invertible
for N ≥ N¯ . We then fix k > 0, N ≥ N¯ and consider an N–players game satisfying assumptions
(H1)–(H3) with ν = k Id. Instead of QG solutions of the form (14), we look for solutions to
the HJB–KFP system (11) satisfying
vi(x) = xT
Λ
2
x+ ρx , mi(x) = γ exp
{
− 1
2
(x− µ)T V
k
√
r
(x − µ)
}
, (42)
for suitable matrices V ∈ Sym+d , Λ ∈ Matd×d(R) and vectors µ, ρ ∈ Rd, which are the same for
all the players. Here, γ is a normalization constant explicitly given by (2π)−d/2
√
det(V −1).
By plugging these expressions into system (11), or by setting V = k
√
rΣ in the proof of
Theorem 2 of [3], one finds that the coefficients Λ, V, ρ, µ must satisfy
V 2 = 2QN + r A2 , (V 2 + (N − 1)BN )µ = P , Λ = √r(V +√r A) , ρ = −√r V µ , (43)
where P :=
(
2QNH + (N − 1)BN∆), and
λi = F i
(
V
k
√
r
, µ
)
− µT V
2
2
µ+ k
√
r tr(V +
√
rA) , (44)
with F i as in (16). It is immediate to check that, under our assumptions, the first two equations
in (43) admit unique solution in Sym+d and R
d, respectively, given by
V =
√
2QN + rA2 , µ = (V 2 + (N − 1)BN )−1 (2QNH + (N − 1)BN∆) , (45)
Since (43) do not depend on k, the same is true for the value function vi and for the mean
vector µ. Only the value λi in (44) is modified by a change of k. Passing finally to the limit as
k → 0+ in (43)–(44), we conclude
vik,N (x)→
√
rV (x− µ) + rAx , mik,N = N
(
µ,
Vk
k
√
r
)
→ δµ , λik,N → F i(0, µ)− µT
V 2
2
µ ,
in the correct topologies, with V and µ given by (45).
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Step 2. Analogous computations can be performed for the mean field equations (18). In this
case, the expression (35) for the value function remains valid as k → 0+, and it is easy to verify
that m = N
(
µˆ, Vˆ
k
√
r
)
→ δµˆ in distributional sense. Since we also have
λ = Fˆ
(
Vˆ
k
√
r
, µˆ
)
− µˆT Vˆ
2
2
µˆ+ k
√
r tr(Vˆ +
√
rA) −→ Fˆ (0, µˆ)− µˆT Vˆ
2
2
µˆ ,
it is enough to pass to the limit as N →∞ in the formulas (45) to complete the proof. ⋄
Remark 5.1 Since (43) is independent from the matrix ν, the assumption (H3) in Theorem 4.2
can be replaced by the following, slightly more general, one:
(H3′) The matrix A is symmetric, there exist a constant r > 0 such that R = r Id, and there
holds ν = k ν¯ for a constant k > 0 and a matrix ν¯ such that ν¯
√
2Q+ rA2 ∈ Symd.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Step 1. The convergence BN := QN + (N − 1) BN2 → B
∞
as
N → +∞ implies that there exists N¯ ∈ N such that BN is invertible for N ≥ N¯ . Fixed
N ≥ N¯ , we thus consider the N–players game (1)–(6) and let r > 0 small enough so that
BN := QN + r A22 + (N − 1) B
N
2 is invertible too.
By looking for solutions of the form (42) in the HJB–KFP system with cost R = r Id, we find
that matrices Λ, V and vectors ρ, µ satisfy again (43)–(44).
When r → 0+, we claim that the value functions vi → 0 uniformly on compact sets. Indeed, for
fixed r > 0, the ARE in (43) admits a unique solution Vr ∈ Sym+d , given by Vr :=
√
2QN + rA2.
As r → 0+, we thus have Vr → V =
√
2QN . Similarly, by passing to the limit in the equa-
tion (43) for µ, we obtain
µr := (V
2
r + (N − 1)BN )−1P −→ µ := (V
2
+ (N − 1)BN)−1P ,
which in turn implies Λ→ 0 and ρ→ 0. It is also simple to verify that the measuresmi converge
in distributional sense to a Dirac delta δµ, centered at µ, and that λ
i
r,N −→ F i(0, µ)−µT V
2
2 µ,
as in the deterministic limit.
Step 2. Fixed r > 0 small enough to have invertibility of the matrix B∞ := Qˆ + r A22 + Bˆ2 , we
repeat the argument used in step 1 for the mean field equations (18). In this case, we get
vr(x) =
√
rVˆr(x− µ) + rAx , mr = N
(
µˆr,
Vˆr
k
√
r
)
,
with Vˆr :=
√
2Qˆ+ rA2 and µˆr := (Vˆ
2
r + Bˆ)
−1
(
2QˆH + Bˆ∆
)
. Then, as r → 0+ we obtain the
convergence of vr and mr to the value function and the measure in (36). From
λr = Fˆ
(
Vˆr
k
√
r
, µˆr
)
− µˆTr
Vˆ 2r
2
µˆr + k
√
r tr(Vˆr +
√
rA) −→ Fˆ (0, µˆ)− µˆT Vˆ
2
2
µˆ .
also the convergence of λr follows. Finally, by passing to the limit as N → +∞ in the formulas
in step 1, it is immediate to prove V → Vˆ and µ→ µˆ, whence the conclusion follows. ⋄
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6 Extensions and open problems
6.1 Games with N different players
For sake of notational simplicity, in this work we have focused our attention on games satisfying
(H2), i.e. games with nearly identical players (see also Definition 4.1 in [3]). However, some
of the results we have presented admit a straightforward generalization to games whose cost
for the player’s state (4) consists of more general matrix coefficients Qijk. The most interesting
extension is probably the characterization of affine Nash equilibria strategies for general games
with discounted cost (2). We replace assumptions (H1)–(H3) with the following
(H) The matrix σ is invertible and the matrix R belongs to Sym+d . Moreover, for all i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, let assume that matrices Qi are symmetric, that the block Qiii ∈ Sym+d and
that (A, ν,R,Qiii) satisfy the Riccati–Sylvester property in the sense of Definition 2.3.
In this case system (5) takes the same form as (11), but with ℓvi in place of λi in the first
equation for each player. Then, we can prove the following result.
Theorem 6.1 Under assumption (H), there exists ℓ¯ > 0 such that for ℓ < ℓ¯ the system of
HJB–KFP equations for the game admits a unique solution (vi,mi) of the form
vi(x) = xT
Λi
2
x+ ρix+ ci , mi(x) = N (µi, (Σi)−1) ,
for suitable symmetric matrices Λi,Σi, with Σi positive definite, vectors µi, ρi and numbers ci,
if and only if the Nd×Nd matrix
B˜ := (B˜αβ)α,β=1,...,N B˜αβ := Qααβ + δαβ ( ATRA2 − ℓ RA2
)
∈Matd×d(R) .
is invertible, δαβ being the Kronecker delta. Moreover, the affine feedbacks α
i(x) = R−1∇vi(x),
for x ∈ Rd and i = 1, . . . , N , provide a Nash equilibrium strategy for the game (1)–(2), for all
initial states X ∈ RNd.
The proof proceeds along the same lines of the one for Theorem 3.1, and it is therefore omitted.
Further extensions to games having matrices Ai, σi, Ri and discount factors ℓi also depending
on the players just require changes in the corresponding notations.
6.2 Games not satisfying (H3)
Comparing the results presented in this paper with the ones in [3], one might easily wonder why
the assumption (H3) is here imposed on some matrix coefficients in the dynamics and the cost.
The answer is related to the algebraic Riccati equations whose solutions give the (inverse of the)
covariance matrix of the desired Gaussian measure. Indeed, in the case of deterministic and
cheap control limits, a large part of the manipulations done on the system (11) of HJB–KFP
equations can still be repeated for games not satisfying (H3). By searching for solutions of the
form
vi(x) = xT
Λ
2
x+ ρx , mi(x) = γ exp
{
− 1
2
(x− µ)T ν−1R−1/2V (x − µ)
}
, (46)
one finds relations similar to (43) and, in particular, we have that V must solve V TV = 2Q+
ATRA. However, in this context we are not searching for solutions V ∈ Symd anymore, but for
a V which makes Σ := ν−1R−1/2V ∈ Sym+d .
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For any fixed choice of the matrices ν and R, the existence and uniqueness result in The-
orem 2 of [3] (see also section 2.4) allows to prove that a unique V with the required prop-
erties exists, and thus that a unique QG solution to (11) exists of the form (46), at least
when (A, ν,R,Q) satisfy the Riccati–Sylvester property in the sense of Definition 2.3 and
B = Q + ATRA2 + (N − 1) B2 is invertible. The problems for these more general games arise
when we try to pass to the limit: Indeed, except for the simple extension mentioned in Re-
mark 5.1, it is not clear whether the sequences of solutions converge, either as ν → 0 or as
R→ 0, to a specific limit matrix V among the many solutions of the limit ARE equation which
is, respectively,
V
T
V = 2Q+ATRA , V
T
V = 2Q .
Analogous issues are found when studying the limits of mean field equations (18).
For the vanishing discount limit there is an additional difficulty, because it is not clear
whether symmetric positive definite solutions to the ARE in (28) exist when (H3) is not sat-
isfied. Indeed, the matrix Aℓ + RYℓ = νR2
(
ℓ
2 Id + νYℓ
)
, with Yℓ ∈ Symd given by Proposi-
tion 2.2(iii), might be not symmetric and have complex eigenvalues if we do not assume (H3).
In this case, it does not seem possible to generally deduce Yℓ > 0 from the estimates on the real
part of eigenvalues of Aℓ +RYℓ.
In our opinion, new results on the algebraic Riccati equations would be necessary to extend
our analysis to more general games, but such extensions are beyond the scope of this work.
6.3 Comparison with previous works on infinite horizon games with
discounted cost
For N–person infinite horizon games with discounted costs there is a rich literature (see [11, 17]
and references therein). Typically, the games considered have a dynamics
dX it =
(
AX it +Bα
i
t
)
dt+D dW it , i = 1, . . . , N , (47)
and cost
J i(X,α1, . . . , αN ) := E
[∫ +∞
0
e−ℓt
(
(αit)
T Rαit
2
+ (X it − Ξt)TQ (Xt − Ξt)
)
dt
]
, (48)
where A,B,D,R,Q ∈Matd×d(R) suitable matrices, R > 0 and Q ≥ 0, and where
Ξt := Γ ·
 1
N
N∑
j=1
Xjt
+ η ∈ Rd , Γ ∈ Matd×d(R) , η ∈ Rd ,
with the term 1/N
∑N
j=1X
j
t representing a sort of average position among the agents (referred
to as the “mean field term” of the game). The typical result for these games is that the
solution of a suitable “mean field system” of ODEs, obtained by formally passing to the limit as
N → +∞ in the HJB equation for (47)–(48) and replacing the mean field term in the cost with
a suitable deterministic function, provides an approximate Nash equilibria for the game (47)–
(48). Namely, the feedback strategy corresponding to such a solution is an ε–Nash equilibrium
strategy with ε = O ( 1N ).
Now observe that the second term in the cost (48) can be rewritten in the form (4), by
choosing X
i
i = η, X
j
i = 0 for j 6= i, and
Qiii =
(
Id − Γ
T
N
)
Q
(
Id − Γ
N
)
, Qiij = −
(
Id − Γ
T
N
)
Q
Γ
N
, Qijk =
ΓT
N
Q
Γ
N
,
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and that (H1) is satisfied whenever Q > 0, since Id − ΓTN is always invertible for N large
enough. Therefore, games (47)–(48) are very similar to the ones we considered in Theorem 3.1.
The main difference is that the cost J i in (48) depends on other players directly through their
state Xj, while in (2) the dependence is present only through their asymptotic distribution mj
in the environment. The novelty in our results is that, thanks to the particular form of the
cost, we are able to characterize exact Nash equilibria for the discounted game (at least for
small values of the discount factor ℓ) and not only of ε–approximate ones. Moreover, we prove
rigorously the convergence of such Nash equilibria to the solutions of the mean field game. The
analogous study in the case of games with cost (48) is still an open problem, to our knowledge.
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